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Abstract Population and labour force projections are made for 27 selected
European countries for 2002–2052, focussing on the impact of international
migration on population and labour force dynamics. Starting from single scenarios
for fertility, mortality and economic activity, three sets of assumptions are ex-
plored regarding migration ﬂows, taking into account probable policy develop-
ments in Europe following the enlargement of the EU. In addition to age
structures, various support ratio indicators are analysed. The results indicate that
plausible immigration cannot offset the negative effects of population and labour
force ageing.
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Re ´sume ´ Des projections de population et de population active sont pre ´sente ´es
pour 27 pays Europe ´ens pour la pe ´riode 2002–2052, avec un inte ´re ˆt particulier pour
l’impact de la migration internationale sur la dynamique des populations. A partir de
sce ´narios uniques pour la fe ´condite ´, la mortalite ´ et l’activite ´ e ´conomique, trois se ´ries
d’hypothe `ses concernant les ﬂux migratoires sont explore ´es, en inte ´grant des pre ´-
visions sur les de ´veloppements des politiques publiques a ` la suite de l’e ´largissement
de l’Union Europe ´enne. Les structures par a ˆge sont analyse ´es, de me ˆme que des
indicateurs de rapports de de ´pendance. Les re ´sultats indiquent que les ﬂux
d’immigration vraisemblables ne pourront pas compenser les effets ne ´gatifs du vi-
eillissement de la population et de celui de la population active.
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1 Introduction
This study presents the results of the projections of population and labour force
resources for 27 selected European countries for the period 2002–2052, focussing on
the impact of international migration on the advancement of the population ageing
process. The analysis covers 27 selected European countries: 23 EU countries
without Cyprus and Malta, 2 EFTA countries: Norway and Switzerland, as well as 2
acceding countries: Bulgaria and Romania. The study thus only includes countries
with over one million inhabitants, an exception being made for Luxembourg due to
its central location in Europe and important position in the European migration
system. Three EU candidate countries (Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Turkey, as of 1 January 2006) have not been considered in the
analysis due to very high political uncertainty regarding the dates and conditions of
their possible accession.
The projections have been prepared under various assumptions concerning
international migration, referred to as Base, High and Low. The Base set of
assumptions is the one likely to occur according to our judgement, while the
other two reﬂect our opinion about the plausible highest and lowest boundaries
of future migration developments. The analysis has been performed using the
MULTIPOLES (MULTIstate POpulation model for multiLEvel Systems) popu-
lation dynamics model developed by Kupiszewski and Kupiszewska (1998).
Extensive supporting material for this study, including a thorough discussion of
the assumptions and detailed country-speciﬁc results, can be found in a number
of papers (Bijak 2004; Bijak, Kupiszewska, Kupiszewski, & Saczuk 2005; Bijak,
Kupiszewski, & Kicinger 2004; Saczuk 2004), downloadable from the website
www.cefmr.pan.pl.
In addition to the ‘Introduction’, the paper comprises ﬁve sections. Section 2
presents the background for the study: selected theoretical aspects of population and
labour force ageing, as well as some empirical evidence with respect to the magni-
tude of these phenomena in Europe. Section 3 contains brief remarks on the input
data used in the projections, the applied model of population dynamics, as well as
the assumptions on the future development of fertility, mortality, international
migration and labour force participation in Europe. The population and labour force
projections are presented in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Sect. 6 offers a
brief summary of the outcome of the study, as well as the most important conclusions
and policy recommendations.
Though there is a distinction between the terms ‘projection’ and ‘forecast’, and
our Base scenario may be considered as a forecast, we will use the term ‘projection’
for both forecasts and projections, for the sake of simplicity.
Throughout the paper, the terms ‘economically active population’ and ‘labour
force’ conform to the deﬁnition depicting the overall labour supply i.e. both the
employed and unemployed. This is a different category than the ‘working-age
population’ assumed to be the overall number of people between 15 and 64 years of
age. Activity rates (also: labour force participation rates) relate the number of the
2 J. Bijak et al.
123active to the overall size of the population (cf. International Labour Organisation
2004). The terms ‘economic activity’ and ‘labour force participation’ are used
interchangeably.
2 Background: population and labour force ageing in Europe
Population ageing is a ‘‘process, by which older individuals become a proportionally
larger share of the total population’’ (United Nations 2002, p. 1). Ageing is a con-
sequence of low fertility and the related low family size, as well as longer life
expectancy, and is additionally inﬂuenced by international migration. Contempo-
rarily, this process seems to be permanent and irreversible (Coleman 2002).
Ageing recently became a very important policy issue, as it has wide-ranging
implications in various areas of social, economic and political life. The most
important side-effects of the ageing process include (United Nations 2002, pp. 1–3):
• increasing public expenditure on pensions, social security and health services,
caused directly by the growing number of elderly (and thus of pensioners) in the
population;
• a decreasing percentage of people in the working age, causing a shrinkage of the
labour force and an increase in the overall burden on the working population in
terms of various intergenerational transfers: taxes, other contributions, family
support etc.;
• increasing risk of failure of repartition (pay-as-you-go) pension systems;
• growing demand for medical care and changing public health patterns (even
though the elderly become relatively ﬁtter and healthier);
• increasing risk of the emergence of intergenerational conﬂicts, due to the changes
in the patterns of resource distribution between the generations.
Although the mentioned problems are not critical yet, the policy-makers must
realise that to overcome the possible future consequences of ageing, appropriate
measures should be implemented soon. This is a very important policy challenge,
embracing many areas of life: economy, social security systems, health care,
education, changes in the attitudes and practices towards the elderly etc. (cf. Euro-
pean Commission 2005; Grant et al. 2004; National Research Council 2001;
Productivity Commission 2005). There seems to be no feasible, exclusively demo-
graphic solution to population ageing, and the remedies for its negative effects need
to be sought among non-demographic policies (Coleman 2002).
There have been attempts to consider immigration as a partial measure against the
effects of ageing, originating from the mathematical demographic models of Pollard
(1973) and Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur (1982), who showed that under certain
conditions immigration leads to a stationary population with a stable age structure.
Recently, the ‘replacement migration’ idea has been explored in a study by Feld
(2000), as well as in a United Nations (2000) report, the latter having been extensively
discussed (Coleman 2002; Espenshade 2001; Lesthaeghe 2000; and others, see Saczuk
2003 for an overview). Studies on ‘replacement migration’ indicate that the number
of immigrants required in order to sustain certain parameters of population struc-
tures would have to be very high. Therefore, reasonable migration ﬂows can inﬂuence
the age structure of the host population only to a limited extent, fertility being much
more important in that respect, especially in the long run. Korcelli (2003) also noted
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national migration policy. The current study aims at formulating plausible migration
ranges for the 27 selected European countries and assessing their impact on the
ageing of the population and the labour force.
There are many measures that may quantify the magnitude of the impact of
ageing on population and labour force structures. With respect to the former, a
commonly used measure is the Potential Support Ratio (PSR), indicating how many
people aged 15–64 in a given population can potentially support one person aged
65 years or more. The age limits of 15 and 65 years, dividing the population into the
pre-working, working and retirement age groups, have been set for all the countries
under study for the sake of comparison with the United Nations (2000) report. It is
worth noting that alongside the interval of 15–64 years, the 20–59 or 20–64 age
intervals are frequently used in similar studies (e.g. Augusztinovics 1999).
Measures like the PSR and its reciprocal (the old-age dependency ratio), are
widely used in research on ageing, but they are only a rough indication of the impact
of the process on the economic situation of the societies. In order to take into
account not only changes in the age structure of the population, but also in the
labour force participation, we propose two additional measures: the Economic
Elderly Support Ratio (EESR) and the Labour Market Support Ratio (LMSR).
Let EESR be deﬁned as the ratio of the whole economically active population
aged 15 years or more to the inactive population in the retirement age (65 years or
more). Thus, such a measure is a proxy of the economic burden of inactive pen-
sioners on the working population, and is therefore an important indicator of the
effects of ageing from the point of view of sustainability of the pension systems.
Further, let LMSR be deﬁned as the ratio of the whole economically active popu-
lation to the whole inactive population, where both the nominator and the
denominator consider people of 15 years or more. This indicator can be interpreted
as a proxy of the overall economic burden of the inactive population on the labour
market. LMSR is thus more general than EESR, as it considers not only the
pensioners, but also younger inactive generations (excluding children), both of which
have to be economically supported by the active population.
It is worth noting that similar measures have already been used in a number of
studies. An equivalent of a reciprocal of the EESR is often referred to as the System
Dependency Ratio (SDR), deﬁned as ‘‘the ratio of those receiving pension beneﬁts
to those accruing pension rights’’ (OECD 2005). The EESR is by necessity more
simplistic than the SDR due to ﬁxed age limits of working and retired populations in
the former measure, the latter being ﬂexible with respect to the age of retirement
(UN ECE 1999, p. 46). Indicators similar to LMSR and its reciprocal are referred to
as for example ‘the economic support ratio’ (Tomorrow’s Company 2005) or ‘the
economic burden’ (Taylor 2003).
The process of ageing in Europe has been progressing substantially in the second
half of the 20th century. Eurostat and Council of Europe data imply that the average
PSR for the 27 countries under study decreased from 6.49 in 1960 to 4.19 in 2002 and
that the country-level variation in the magnitude of ageing measured by the PSR is
strongly interrelated with past fertility changes. The average EESR indicates that in
2002 each economically inactive person in the 65+ age group corresponded to 3.09
active persons. The mean LMSR of 1.30 for the same year denotes a heavy burden of
the economically inactive on the active population.
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to 5.49 for Poland, 6.09 for Ireland and 6.11 for the Slovak Republic. As concerns
the economic burden of pensioners on the active population, the EESR varied from
2.21 for Italy, 2.55 for Belgium and 2.62 for Bulgaria to 4.30 for the Slovak Republic,
4.52 for Ireland and 5.59 for Romania. The exceptionally good position of Romania
is primarily due to the broad deﬁnition of the economically active population
combined with a strong income effect in this country (Saczuk 2004). With respect to
the labour market burden measured by LMSR, in 2002 the best situation was ob-
served in Switzerland (2.06), Denmark (1.99) and Norway (1.96), while the worst in
Bulgaria (1.03), Hungary (0.96) and Italy (0.88). In the two latter countries, the
economically inactive have already outnumbered the active population. Country-
speciﬁc values of all three indicators are presented in Tables 3 and 5 in further parts
of this paper.
In terms of the advancement of population ageing and its negative economic and
labour market effects in Europe, the situation of Italy is clearly the worst, due to
very low fertility and labour force participation. Ageing processes and their negative
labour market consequences are also fairly advanced in Belgium, Bulgaria and
Hungary. On the other hand, a relatively good situation with respect to a combi-
nation of various support ratios can so far be observed in Denmark, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland and the Slovak Republic; in the ﬁrst four countries
mainly due to the high economic activity rates, while in the latter two—to the young
population structures.
The current analysis aims to contribute to the debate on ageing, by providing
population and labour force projections for the 27 selected European countries for
the period 2002–2052, conditional on the demographic situation, in particular the
magnitude of migratory ﬂows in the area under study. The existing projections of
population include for example US Census Bureau (2004), World Bank (2005),
United Nations (2005) and Eurostat (2005), and with respect to the labour force and
economic aspects, Coleman (1992), Roseveare, Leibniz, Fore, and Wurzel (1996)
and Feld (2000). In our study the analysis focuses on the impact of international
migration on the aggregate indicators of population ageing, as well as pension sys-
tems and labour market burdens. Speciﬁc features of the current research include:
(1) improved, more detailed treatment of international migration; (2) formulating
assumptions on policy developments in Europe following the EU enlargement; (3)
analysis of projected social security burdens in terms of proposed aggregate mea-
sures, the EESR and the LMSR; (4) analysis of sensitivity of the results to fertility
and economic activity assumptions.
The analysis of the sensitivity of the results to the retirement age is deliber-
ately omitted in the current study, as it has already been considered elsewhere
(United Nations 2000). We consider our approach to be more complete than the
one based solely on raising the legally deﬁned retirement age. In the current
study, some economic activity improvement beyond the age of 65 years is as-
sumed, which is reﬂected in the EESR and LMSR indicators. Moreover, the
retirement age of 65 years is already signiﬁcantly higher than the actual (not
ofﬁcial) retirement ages observed recently in almost every European country (UN
ECE 1999, p. 47). Therefore, the assumption about the upper limit of the
working age at 65 years can to a certain extent accommodate for the future
increase in the real age at retirement.
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3.1 Data sources used in this study
In quantitative terms, this analysis is based on demographic data from the ofﬁcial
statistical registration of population, births, deaths and migratory events in the
countries under study, collected by Eurostat and the Council of Europe. Data on
labour force participation have been taken from the database of the International
Labour Organisation (2004). Five-year groups of age are used: for population stocks
and mortality for ages 0–84 years and 85+, for fertility by age of mother within the
range 15–49 years and for economic activity for ages 15–74 and 75+.
Migration ﬂows have been estimated as the higher of the values reported by the
sending and receiving countries. Their age schedules have been predominantly
assumed to be the same as in the case of migration between Germany and a
particular country, due to the limitations imposed by incomplete country-speciﬁc
statistics on migration by age. Germany has been selected as a reference for age
schedules due to the completeness of data and a signiﬁcant share in European
migration ﬂows. The exceptions are: migration to the Mediterranean, where the age
distributions have been estimated from the data of the receiving countries, and
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where average schedules of migration
between Germany and all European countries have been applied.
Details concerning the sources used, the methodology of veriﬁcation of their
quality, as well as their preparation for input into the projection model can be found
in the respective background papers on demographic, migration and labour partic-
ipation scenarios (Bijak 2004; Bijak et al. 2004; Saczuk 2004).
3.2 MULTIPOLES model of population dynamics—general remarks
The population projection model applied in this study, MULTIPOLES, was origi-
nally created by Kupiszewski and Kupiszewska (1998) basing on the ideas of P.H.
Rees (Rees 1996; Rees, Stillwell, & Convey 1992). The MULTIPOLES model was
constructed according to the modelling paradigm set out by Rogers (1975). It is a
cohort-component female-dominated, multi-regional, multi-country model. The
population is disaggregated into two sexes, 18 5-year age groups (i.e. 19 projection
cohorts, with the cohort number 0 being the birth cohort and the cohort 85+ being
the last one), as well as countries and regions (but the regional dimension has not
been used in this study). The model is based on the movement type population
accounts, which use counts of migration moves during a period, as recorded for
example by population registration systems. For a discussion of movement type
accounts and alternative transition type accounts (which look at the location of
migrants at the beginning and the end of a projection period) see Rees and Wille-
kens (1981).
Occurrence-exposure rates appearing in the MULTIPOLES accounts are deﬁned
as the number of events (deaths, migration or births) in a projection period divided
by the population at risk, calculated as an arithmetic average of the population of the
projection cohort at the beginning and at the end of the projection period. Inter-
national migration is handled on two geographical levels. The ﬁrst level involves
population exchange between the countries under study, while the second level
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outside the group of 27 countries, considered together).
Below, the main projection equations of the MULTIPOLES model have been
presented. For simplicity, matrix notation has been used, and sex, region and country
indexes have not been shown explicitly. There are three different equations: for the
birth cohort, for the oldest open–ended cohort, and for the other cohorts, formulated
as follows:
P0ðt þ uÞ¼F00ðt;t þ uÞ½Bðt;t þ uÞþMEXT00ðt;t þ uÞ ; ð1Þ
PAþðt þ uÞ¼SAþðt;t þ uÞPAþðtÞþFAþðt;t þ uÞMEXTAþðt;t þ uÞþ
SA uðt;t þ uÞPA uðtÞþFA uðt;t þ uÞMEXTðA uÞðt;t þ uÞ;
ð2Þ
Paþuðt þ uÞ¼Saðt;t þ uÞPaðtÞþFaðt;t þ uÞMEXTaðt;t þ uÞ; ð3Þ
where
Saðt;t þ uÞ¼½ Iþ0:5Maðt;t þ uÞ 
 1½I 0:5Maðt;t þ uÞ ; ð4Þ
Faðt;t þ uÞ¼½ Iþ0:5Maðt;t þ uÞ 
 1: ð5Þ
I is the identity matrix and Ma(t, t + u) is a matrix dependent on death rates,
internal emigration rates and on international emigration rates (for ﬂows to the 27
European countries).
The meaning of the indexes in the formulas (1–5) is as follows: u—span of the age
groups and the length of a projection step; t—time; a—age group (covering persons
at the age from a to a + u years); 00—the birth cohort; A+—the oldest, open–ended
age group, covering persons of age A or more. The stock variables are:
The event variables are:
In MULTIPOLES, fertility and mortality are modelled using age-speciﬁc
occurrence-exposure rates, albeit the assumptions on future development of both
components of natural change of the populations under study are prepared,
respectively, in terms of total fertility rates (TFR) and life expectancy at birth (e0),
Pa(t) — Population in age group a at time t, that means at the beginning
of a projection step
Pa(t + u) — Population in age group a at time t + u, that means at the end of a
projection step
B(t, t + u) — Births over the period (t, t + u);
Da(t, t + u) — Deaths in age group a over the period (t, t + u);
MEXTa(t, t + u) — Net migration from the Rest of the world (‘external migration’)
in age group a over the period (t, t + u)
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potentially inﬂuenced by international migration, we assume that migrants adjust
to the fertility patterns of the host population, which is supported for example by
the recent ﬁndings of Kulu (2005). The same applies to mortality, where this
assumption can be justiﬁed by migrants gaining access to health care services at
destination, and being exposed to the same environmental hazards as the host
population.
In addition to modelling and projecting the overall population change, the
MULTIPOLES model allows for including assumptions on future labour force
participation trends, and is therefore also suitable for labour force projections. For
practical use, the model has been programmed as specialised computer software,
developed and continuously improved by D. Kupiszewska, since 1996. A thorough
description of the model is available in Kupiszewski (2002), as well as Kupiszewska
and Kupiszewski (2005). The model and the software have been recently re-designed
speciﬁcally for the purpose of the current study.
3.3 Fertility assumptions
The societal changes that have occurred in developed countries since the 1960s and
now seem to be durable, resulted in below-replacement fertility levels. A variety of
explanations of these trends have been offered, for example the hypothesis of
fertility adjustment to the relative well-being of particular cohorts (Easterlin 1968),
the theory of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa 1986), or
the economic analysis of opportunity costs of childbearing (Becker 1991). Thus, a
return to the replacement-level fertility in the future cannot be feasibly assumed,
especially given strong processes of individualisation that have been taking place in
Europe, although the possibility of further changes in societal values cannot be
excluded.
There is no evidence that any single policy measure can signiﬁcantly reverse or
stop fertility decline. As noted by Grant et al. (2004), given different contexts of
fertility (social, economic, political etc.), only a blend of various types of intervention
has a chance to work in the long run. Muszyn ´ska (2006), corroborating the ideas
presented by Liefbroer and Corijn (1999), noted that not only socially supported
(policy-related), but also socially accepted (in a normative sense) arrangements for
the reconciliation of a career and family life have an impact on fertility. This sup-
ports the notion of van de Kaa (2003) that fertility decline can be reversed for
example through perceiving childbearing as a way of self-realisation of the parents, a
process that is likely to happen ﬁrst in Western Europe, and with a time delay in the
other parts of the continent. The economic and institutional settings may become
involved, but primarily as additional inﬂuencing factors rather than the main
determinants of the fertility trend. In any case, some increase of period fertility
levels in Europe is expected, primarily due to the recuperation of the childbearing
postponed in the past (Sobotka 2004).
Therefore, the fertility scenario assumes a short-term continuation of past trends
in the total period fertility rates (TFR) and their slight increase in the longer term.
The target values for 2052 reﬂect to a large extent the current diversity of child-
bearing patterns across Europe, as well as the level of advancement of particular
countries in the process of the second demographic transition. Thus, the bottom end
of the target TFR values assumed for 2052 is 1.4 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 1.5
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with the exception of Estonia (1.6) and Portugal (1.7). By 2052, the countries with a
relatively high fertility are assumed to be Belgium, Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom (TFR of 1.8), as well as France, Ireland, the Netherlands and all the Scan-
dinavian countries (1.9). These assumptions, presented in Table 1, thus reﬂect a lack
of convergence of fertility patterns in Europe. It is worth noting that the target TFR
valuesarenotveryfarfromtheonesassumedbyEurostat(2005)for2050,differingon
average only by 0.02 children per woman, with the biggest difference for the Neth-
erlands (1.75 in the Eurostat’s projection as compared to 1.9 in the current one).
3.4 Mortality assumptions
The question of the limits of human longevity has always been a very controversial
issue among demographers and epidemiologists. All theoretical limits to life
expectancy (e.g. Olshansky, Carnes, & Cassel 1990) have been subsequently
surpassed by real-life developments, which were not usually foreseen by population
forecasters (Oeppen & Vaupel 2002). As argued by Christensen and Vaupel (1996),
only a quarter of the variation in the length of life in the developed countries can be
attributed to genetic factors and thus there is still much left to improve from the
medical, behavioural and environmental side.
With a certain dose of optimism it is assumed that although one cannot exclude
the emergence of new infectious diseases, their impact on public health in the
developed countries will likely be offset by technological, institutional and
behavioural changes. As a result, the maximum life expectancy observed worldwide
is envisaged to continue increasing, although at a declining pace, unlike in the linear
hypothesis of Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). For Western Europe, one can expect a
visible convergence of the trends, both to the maximum level and also within this
group of countries. For Central and Eastern Europe, however, only a slow conver-
gence towards the highest values can reasonably be assumed, due to large initial
disparities in comparison with most developed countries. Due to institutional, eco-
nomic and social circumstances it will undoubtedly take the post-socialist countries
many more years to recover in terms of mortality improvements, although the recent
trends already indicate an upturn from the post-transformation crisis (Mesle ´ 2004).
With regard to mortality scenarios, the highest life expectancy at birth in 2052 is
expected for the Western European countries, in particular for Switzerland, Italy,
Spain, France, Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany and the Benelux. The
projected values for these countries are very close to the maximum ones, assumed to
equal ca. 85 years for males and 90 years for females. Among the European coun-
tries under study, the lowest values are envisaged for the Baltic States, Bulgaria and
Romania. The minimum life expectancy for males projected for 2052 is the one for
Latvia (76 years), while for females—the one for Romania (83 years). Additionally,
a decline of the life expectancy gap between males and females is assumed for all the
countries under study. Detailed country-speciﬁc assumptions for 2052 are presented
in Table 1 and thoroughly discussed in Bijak (2004).
3.5 International migration assumptions
The assumptions on international migration for the countries under study have been
done differently for two categories of ﬂows, following Kupiszewski (2002). Migration
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123among the 27 countries has been quantiﬁed in terms of emigration rates per 1,000
population of the source country (speciﬁed separately for each direction of ﬂow).
Setting the assumptions in terms of migration rates rather than crude numbers allows
to capture the propensity to migrate more adequately and to avoid problems with
the artiﬁcial acceleration of depopulation in the countries with a negative population
growth. The scenarios of migration exchange with the Rest of the world (‘external
migration’) concern crude net migration numbers, as in this case it is hardly possible
to deﬁne the population at risk to which the observed migration ﬂows can be related.
For both categories of ﬂows various sets of assumptions (scenarios) have been for-
mulated, based on the qualitative analysis of migration factors.
When preparing the scenarios of net international migration from the Rest of the
world, the economic and political situation at the fringes of the enlarged EU has
been considered, including the former USSR, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, the
Maghreb countries, as well as other important sending regions, like China. It is
foreseen that inﬂows to Europe will continue regardless of the pace of the socio-
economic development in the countries of origin. Existing disparities in income and
living conditions between Europe and most of the outside world will constitute,
among other determinants, a strong pull factor to migrate. An overview of macro-
economic determinants of migration has been recently presented by Jennissen
(2004), who identiﬁed income differences per capita and unemployment as the most
important factors. On the other hand, policy measures aimed at limiting migration or
shaping it in a desired way, like attracting highly skilled professionals, are almost
certainly going to be implemented. Other important migration factors, including
political crises, armed conﬂicts, environmental problems etc. have not been con-
sidered in setting the scenarios, due to the unpredictability of both their timing and
magnitude of their impact on population ﬂows. For this reason, the presented sce-
narios focus on economic migrants and their family members rather than, for
example, on asylum seekers.
The following three scenarios are envisaged:
• The Base scenario, with a sustained improvement of economic, political and
social situation worldwide, resulting in a moderate, positive net inﬂow to Europe.
Policy measures are assumed not to be restrictive, due to a relatively good and
stable socio-economic situation in Europe.
• The Low scenario, assuming economic stagnation both in Europe and in the Rest
of the world, the latter more important as a strong positive (encouraging) push
factor, than the former as a negative (deterrent) pull factor. This combination
would result in migration pressure on the developed countries, which would in
this scenario be offset by restrictive migration policies. An overall effect would
be a decline of net migration registered in the European countries.
• The High scenario, assuming dynamic economic growth and social development,
resulting in a demand for foreign labour and thus leading to relatively liberal
immigration policies. Economic growth in the developing regions is assumed to
be a factor contributing to an increased mobility of people worldwide.
The Low and High scenarios are designed as upper and lower boundaries of a
variety of possible, but not quantiﬁed here, future developments of international
migration. For example, one can imagine a combination of high economic growth
and strict migration policies, or low growth and liberal policies. Such (not very
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123probable) scenarios would result in migration ﬂows that would be in-between the
ones projected in the Low and High variants. On the other hand, asymmetric growth
in Europe and in other parts of the world would likely cause an adjustment of
European migration policy measures to suit the aims of the receiving countries in the
ﬁrst place. In effect, the observed registered ﬂows would also likely ﬁt into the
plausible span set by the Low and High scenarios.
Similar assumptions for the Base, High and Low scenarios are envisaged for
population ﬂows among the 27 countries under study, although with some alterations
resulting from the gradual opening of the labour markets of the old EU-15 countries
to the citizens of the new member states. Hence, the Base scenario assumes a stable,
favourable socio-economic situation in Europe and a long-term convergence of
income levels in all European countries. The ﬁrst factor is expected to result in an
overall increase in mobility following the increase of job opportunities abroad, while
the latter in a reduction of income-related push factors to emigrate from Central and
Eastern Europe to the West. The positive effects of European integration are likely
to occur in full in the long term, which is going to intensify the returns of former
emigrants. We also assume that, after the process of European integration with
respect to freedom of movement of labour is completed, migration policies will not
affect population movements within the enlarged EU.
The Low scenario envisages economic stagnation in Europe, with high unem-
ployment levels and related structural labour market problems. With hardly any
factors increasing the overall spatial mobility due to very slow income growth and
few new job opportunities, the key factor shaping population movements in Europe
is likely to be high migration pressure of Central and Eastern Europe on the West
European countries.
In the High scenario, substantial economic growth and fast convergence of the
economies and of the living standards are expected for all European countries,
boosting the overall mobility within Europe and reducing the push factors to
emigrate from the less developed regions, including Central and Eastern Europe.
The timing of the gradual liberalisation of the labour markets of the old EU-15
for the citizens of the new member states is framed by the Treaty on Accession
signed in April 2004 (European Communities 2003). According to the Treaty, the
old EU-15 countries were given the right to introduce transitory provisions for 2, 5 or
maximally 7 years in order to limit the access to their labour markets for workers
originating from the new member states. In 2004, only Ireland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom did not introduce any such measures.
On the basis of the economic and political situation in the other EU-15 countries,
a scenario of probable future dates of deﬁnitive opening of the labour markets has
been set. Note that the assumptions presented here reﬂect a state of knowledge as of
2005 and that political decisions taken by particular countries may differ from the
presented scenario. We assumed that Denmark, Finland and the Benelux countries,
as well as Norway (a country of the European Economic Area and as such bound by
the Treaty on Accession) are likely to open their labour markets for the new EU
nationals in 2006. For them, the introduction of the transitional period was probably
an insurance against the unpredictable effects of the enlargement rather than a
necessity to protect their labour markets. The limited wave of post-accession
migration to Ireland, Sweden and the UK, conﬁrmed by statistics presented in a
recent report by the European Commission (2006), can be an important factor
encouraging the introduction of a full freedom of movement policy.
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123The southern EU-15 countries: Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece are less
likely to open their labour markets in 2006 and judging by such economic factors as
high unemployment rates, 2009 seems to be more probable in that respect. Germany
and Austria are almost sure to extend the restrictions on access to their labour
markets for the maximal period, until 2011, due to high unemployment, popularity
of anti-immigrant slogans and the close proximity of the new member countries.
Switzerland does not currently participate in the free movement of workers in
Europe, although this will likely be gradually liberalised by 2007 for EU-15 citizens
and by 2011 for the new member states (cf. DFA 2005; European Communities
2002). Bulgaria and Romania will join the EU in 2007 according to the Accession
Treaty signed in April 2005 (European Communities 2005) and identical transitional
provisions have been provided for them with regard to the free ﬂow of workers. In
this study it is assumed that Western European labour markets will open for
Bulgarians and Romanians according to the similar schedule as above, but with a
3-year delay.
In general, an overall migration trend is assumed in all scenarios, with the gradual
introduction of the freedom of movement policy marked through temporary devi-
ations from the primary tendency, followed by returns of migration levels to their
general trends in the long-term. Following the full implementation of the freedom of
movement policy, the size and direction of migratory ﬂows is going to depend
heavily on the disparities between origin and destination countries.
The most important changes can be thus expected with respect to population
ﬂows from Central and South-Eastern to Western and Northern Europe. Their
magnitude depends on differences in income between particular countries, as well as
on the scenario type. With respect to eastward migration it is assumed that there will
be an increase in population ﬂows, yet rather limited in size. It is envisaged that
labour movements between the old and new EU member states will increasingly
become two-way ﬂows, although the primary source of eastward migration will be
the returns of earlier emigrants.
Numerically, scenarios of ﬂows among the 27 countries multiply the initial
origin–destination rates by factors consisting of two components: an overall trend
(a constant level in the Low scenario, mobility increase by 0.5% yearly in the
Base scenario and by 1% in the High one) and temporal deviations resulting
from the labour market policies discussed above. ‘External’ migration scenarios
are quantiﬁed using an exponential extrapolation from the 2002 values to the
target ones, presented in Table 1. Details of qualitative assumptions, their
quantiﬁcation and target values of particular variables are given in Bijak et al.
(2004).
In addition to migration scenarios mentioned above, the Status Quo projection
has been prepared, assuming constant migration rates for ﬂows between the 27
countries and constant crude net migration from the Rest of the world, the same as
observed in 2002. The results are similar to those obtained for the Base scenario,
with some country-level exceptions. The most notable include Spain, where constant
immigration at 2002 level lowers the projected burden of the inactive persons in
comparison to Base scenario throughout the projection period, as well as Poland, the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, where assumed constant net outﬂow of
migrants increases this burden. The detailed results for the Status Quo scenario, not
presented here, can be found in Bijak et al. (2005).
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In the last 20 years rapid changes on the labour markets have been observed.
Economic activity of women has increased substantially while that of older workers
has decreased. These factors, combined with an evolution of social roles and insti-
tutional settings, resulted in an expansion of the share and position of women in the
labour force. Motherhood still depresses female labour force participation, but in
more and more countries the development of childcare services and social habits
facilitate higher economic activity of women (European Commission 2003). In many
countries under study e.g. Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the female
participation patterns resemble the male one, only with slightly lower levels of age-
speciﬁc participation rates.
It is expected that in the coming decades the economic activity of women will
further increase. The process will be most noticeable for women aged 25–54 years
and will be particularly dynamic in the countries with relatively low rates i.e. Italy,
Spain and Greece. By 2052 all countries in the study should reach an inverted
U-shaped pattern of female economic activity, with only small differences in levels
of activity between the countries.
A drastic decline of participation in the oldest age groups has been related to the
development of social security systems and the possibility of an earlier retirement.
As the latter shall probably end soon, it is foreseen that the social security systems
will be reorganised. New rules should create incentives to work longer with no
breaks in careers, increasing the age-speciﬁc participation rates of older people.
Encouragement to higher activity of older workers, however, should also come from
the demand side of the market, involving ﬂexible work schedules, part-time jobs etc.
The latter would ensure that older people’s willingness to work would not be con-
fronted with poor employment prospects (Kotowska 2003).
Hence, it is envisaged that in 2052 the economic activity of older workers will be
much higher compared to current levels in most of the countries. The current decade
will, however, still be the time of the continuation of the country trends and only
later the trends will start to converge to the assumed target values. If rapid changes
of the economic activity of older workers are expected, they are assumed to take
place around 2030. Despite the age-speciﬁc labour force participation rates for
women being lower than those for men, scenarios for all the countries assume that
the economic activity of older men and women should stabilise on the same level in
the long run. The case of Finland, where the female participation rates in a few older
age groups are higher than the male ones, demonstrates that such an assumption is
not unrealistic.
A recent sharp decline of the economic activity of young people was the effect of
technological progress which, creating demand for speciﬁc skills and knowledge,
lifted up the value of education. Since the economic returns from additional years of
schooling went up, ever more young people are engaging in different forms of
education, which excludes market activity and lowers participation rates (Green,
Owen, & Wilson 2001).
Therefore, a continuation of past trends is expected in the current decade, which
in many countries means a further decline of participation rates of the young. In this
period particularly rapid declines will be observed in most Central and East
European countries. It is envisaged, however, that the development of ﬂexible forms
of employment will enable the reconciliation of education with economic activity
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123and will allow for an increase of activity rates in the 15–24 age group after 2015 and
their stabilisation on higher levels in the long run. In a few cases (especially in
Northern European countries), due to exceptionally high current levels of labour
force participation, the target values have been modiﬁed upwards (details in Saczuk 2004).
The only group for which a stagnation or even a moderate decline in economic
activity can be expected within the next 50 years are the middle-aged men.
Assumptions on the target age-speciﬁc labour force participation rates have been
prepared separately for men (a common pattern for all countries under study) and
for women (distinguishing three groups of countries according to their recent activity
patterns: the high participation countries, the low participation countries and Central
and Eastern Europe). A summary of the assumptions is presented in Table 2.
4 Population projection results under various migration scenarios, 2002–2052
4.1 Base migration scenario
Under the Base scenario, the overall population size of the 27 countries under study
is hardly going to change over the next 50 years: from the initial 494.2 million in
2002, to 494.9 million half a century later (Table 3). However, this stability is to a
large extent owing to immigration from other parts of the world. Between 2002 and
2052, 58.5 million people net are assumed to immigrate to the countries under study
(on average 1.2 million persons yearly). Should only natural change and migration
between the countries under study be considered, the 2052 population of the 27
countries would be smaller by 16%.
Important changes that are likely to concern European countries in the coming
50 years are related to the shifts in age structures as a consequence of the
Table 2 Age-speciﬁc labour force participation rates assumed for 2052 (%)
Age group Males Females
Low participation
a High participation
b Central–Eastern
Europe
c
15–19 40 30 40 30
20–24 75 65 65 65
25–29 93 75 80 75
30–34 95 80 85 85
35–39 95 80 85 85
40–44 95 80 85 85
45–49 95 80 85 85
50–54 90 75 75 75
55–59 70 60 60 60
60–64 40 40 40 40
65–69 25 25 25 25
70–74 15 15 15 15
75+ 5 5 5 5
a Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United
Kingdom
b Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
c Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia
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123advancement in population ageing. A visible decline in the number and proportion
of young people is expected, combined with an increase in the older age groups,
including the oldest-old (85 years or more). The most numerous age group is pre-
dicted to shift from 35–39 years of age in 2002 to 60–64 years 50 years ahead.
A comparison of age pyramids for the countries under study in 2002 and 2052 is
presented in Fig. 1. The pyramids for 2052 graphically distinguish the demographic
structures of the population already present in the countries under study in 2002 and
their descendants (‘original’ population, no shading), and those of the post-2002
immigrants and their descendants (‘newcomers’, shading depending on the sce-
nario). To differentiate between the two structures, an auxiliary simulation of
population developments has been used, assuming no migration from the Rest of the
world.
The advancement of ageing can also be seen in terms of aggregate measures
assessing its impact on population. The PSR is expected to decrease from 4.19
persons in the working age (15–64) per one aged 65+ in 2002 to 1.82 in 2052. On the
country level, the PSR values projected for 2052 vary from 1.48 for Italy and Spain to
2.33 for Ireland (see Table 3). The other countries where the ageing process is going
to be relatively little advanced over the next half a century, are the ones with
relatively high-fertility levels. This especially concerns Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Denmark and Norway. On the other extreme are the countries of Southern
and South-Eastern Europe, including (in addition to Italy and Spain) Bulgaria,
Slovenia and Greece. This overview shows that the degree of projected ageing is
strongly diversiﬁed among the countries under study and primarily concerns
Southern and Central–Eastern Europe.
The presented results are comparable with the outcome of the recent Eurostat
(2005) population projections. The Base population projected for 2052 (excluding
Norway and Switzerland, not covered by the latter analysis) is only by 2% higher
than the one projected by Eurostat for 2050 in its baseline variant. Some minor
country-level differences are mainly due to different assumptions on international
migration. The projected PSR values are also similar, especially on the European
level.
Population
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Fig. 1 Population and labour force age pyramids of the 27 countries, 2002 and 2052—Base, Low,
High and ‘no external migration’ scenarios. Source—Eurostat, own calculations
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1234.2 High and Low migration scenarios
Under the High scenario assumptions, the total population size of all the countries
under study is going to increase by 14% during the projection period, from 494
million in 2002 to 563 million in 2052. Over 50 years, about 109 million people net
are assumed to come as immigrants to the 27 European countries, on average 2.2
million yearly.
The shifts in the age structures expected in the High scenario are similar to those
in the Base one, yet with proportionally more immigrants and their descendants in
all age groups. The impact of increased immigration can be seen here as a more
moderate decline in the proportion of the younger generations, as well as a more
gentle increase in the share of the older age groups, including the oldest-old. Thus,
due to the inﬂow of more immigrants, who are relatively younger than the receiving
population, the ageing process in the High projection variant is slightly less advanced
than in the Base one. The average PSR in 2052 is expected to equal 2.05, ranging
from 1.67 for Spain and 1.70 for Italy and Bulgaria to 2.57 for Ireland and 2.62 for
Luxembourg.
Under the conditions assumed in the Low scenario, the overall population size of
the 27 European countries is envisaged to decline to 447 million in 2052, that is by
10%, mainly due to limited immigration from the other parts of the world not being
able to balance out low fertility. During the whole period 2002–2052, the total
number of ‘external’ immigrants to the 27 countries under study in the Low scenario
is expected to be only about 22.8 million people net, thus on average less than half a
million a year.
The projected changes in the age structures in the countries under study resemble
the ones obtained for the Base scenario, although with proportionally less immi-
grants observed in all the age groups. Reduced immigration streams result in more
rapid ageing of the populations. The age pyramid is much slimmer, with more ad-
vanced relative decline in the proportion of the younger generations in the popu-
lation (see Fig. 1). The average PSR in the Low variant is expected to reach 1.60,
ranging between 1.30 for Bulgaria and 2.15 for Ireland.
The span between the High and Low scenarios regards therefore not only the
estimated ﬁnal population and the labour force size of the 27 countries, but also
more importantly, the age structures and thus the advancement of the ageing process
with its economic consequences, as indicated in Fig. 1. These differences are almost
exclusively due to the impact of immigration of generally younger people from the
Rest of the world.
5 Labour force projection under various migration scenarios, 2002–2052
5.1 Base migration scenario
This section describes the projections of the future labour force, i.e. the overall
labour supply comprised of both employed and unemployed, estimated by weighting
the total size of the working-age population (aged 15–64 years) by age-speciﬁc
economic activity rates. According to the Base scenario, the overall labour supply of
the 27 countries will decline by almost 10%, from 233 million people in 2002 to 210
million 50 years later. In 2052, immigrants and their descendants are going to ac-
18 J. Bijak et al.
123count for one-ﬁfth of the total labour force. The overall economic activity rate for
population aged 15 years or more is expected to decrease from 57% in 2002 to 49%
in 2052. This is a direct result of the projected demographic change, which is much
stronger than the assumed increase in age-speciﬁc labour force participation rates.
The country-speciﬁc ﬁgures for the overall labour force, as well as for the 15+ labour
force participation rates for 2002 and 2052 are presented in Table 4.
Apart from the changes in the size, signiﬁcant shifts in the age structures of the
labour force are expected. In particular, the shares of the middle-age groups are
going to decrease. The proportion of the young age groups (15–24) in the labour
force will remain almost the same in 2052 as in 2002 (about 12%). The most sig-
niﬁcant changes can be foreseen for the older age groups (65+), for which both the
size and the proportion in the total labour force is going to increase more than 3
times. This is a combined result of the assumed increase in the labour force par-
ticipation of older people, and the projected increase of the share of persons aged
65+ in the total population. The growing signiﬁcance of the older age groups in the
total labour force will no doubt require developing institutional facilities encour-
aging their active participation in the labour market.
Changes in population and labour force structures projected for 2052 are also
reﬂected in the EESR and the LMSR indicators deﬁned in Sect. 2, i.e. the measures
of the overall burden of ageing on social security systems and on the labour force. In
the 27 European countries, the EESR is expected to decline on average from 3.09 in
2002 to 1.51 in 2052. The LMSR is predicted to decrease from 1.30 to 0.95. Without
migration exchange with the other parts of the world, these values would be even
smaller.
On the country level, a diversity of the projected labour force structures and their
changes can be observed in Europe, with the most visible consequences of ageing in
Southern and Central–Eastern Europe and relatively more modest in the North. The
country-speciﬁc values of the EESR and the LMSR for 2002 and 2052 are presented
in Table 5. Additionally, Figs. 2, 3 and 4 illustrate the Base scenario changes of the
PSR, the EESR and the LMSR, respectively (note different bar scales used in the
three ﬁgures).
At the end of the projection period, the order of countries ranked by the EESR
and the LMSR values is very similar to their ranking by fertility levels, modiﬁed by
the labour force participation patterns (more so in the case of the LMSR) and only
with a very limited effect of the advancement of the ageing process prior to 2002.
Notably, the relatively high ranks of Central and Eastern European countries at the
beginning of the projection period are mostly due to the young population struc-
tures. In total, 50 years ahead, these countries loose their favourable position, mainly
as a result of the pertaining low-fertility levels. In the Scandinavian countries the
opposite is the case: their population structure was regressive already in 2002. The
relatively high fertility and economic activity levels during the whole projection
period place them at the top of the EESR and LMSR rankings in 2052. The maxi-
mum values of these indicators are expected for Norway: EESR equal to 2.0 and
LMSR equalling 1.3. The signiﬁcance of high fertility is demonstrated by France,
while the case of Switzerland proves that relatively high labour force participation
can, to a large extent, make up for low fertility and resulting unfavourable changes in
the population structure.
Southern European countries (Italy, Greece and Spain) demonstrate how far the
labourmarketconsequencesoftheageingprocessinEuropecandevelopoverthenext
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12350 years. Very low EESR and LMSR values for these countries (in Italy, respec-
tively, 1.07 and 0.68) stem from the lowest fertility and economic activity levels in
Europe; it is expected that in half a century the share of the active population 15+
in all three countries will be less than 45%. With respect to the high EESR and
LMSR values for Romania, it should be kept in mind that the very high economic
activity observed especially in the oldest age groups has a different character than
in the other countries under study (Saczuk 2004) and thus the results are not
directly comparable.
5.2 High and Low migration scenarios
In the High scenario the total labour force resources of the 27 countries under study
are expected to increase by 6% (to 247 million) between 2002 and 2052. As a result
of the increased number of (young) immigrants from the other parts of the world,
the labour force participation rate, equalling 51%, will be slightly higher than in the
Base scenario. At the end of the projection period, the post-2002 immigrants and
Table 5 Economic Elderly Support Ratio (EESR), Labour Market Support Ratio (LMSR), 2002
and 2052: Low, Base, High and ‘no external migration’ scenarios
Country EESR LMSR
2002 Scenarios for 2052 2002 Scenarios for 2052
Low Base High No ext.
mig.
Low Base High No ext.
mig.
Austria 3.23 1.25 1.38 1.56 1.15 1.41 0.82 0.89 0.97 0.78
Belgium 2.55 1.46 1.63 1.86 1.39 1.07 0.89 0.95 1.04 0.86
Bulgaria 2.62 1.07 1.25 1.42 1.11 1.03 0.77 0.86 0.94 0.79
Czech Republic 3.78 1.16 1.36 1.61 1.11 1.48 0.79 0.88 0.99 0.76
Denmark 3.92 1.83 1.97 2.15 1.75 1.99 1.20 1.27 1.34 1.17
Estonia 3.48 1.55 1.73 1.94 1.55 1.39 1.00 1.07 1.15 1.00
Finland 3.41 1.65 1.78 1.94 1.58 1.61 1.09 1.15 1.22 1.06
France 2.78 1.78 1.94 2.16 1.68 1.23 1.12 1.19 1.27 1.07
Germany 2.94 1.27 1.42 1.63 1.17 1.39 0.87 0.94 1.03 0.82
Greece 2.86 1.07 1.20 1.37 1.00 1.13 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.66
Hungary 2.72 1.34 1.56 1.85 1.29 0.96 0.85 0.95 1.06 0.83
Ireland 4.52 1.67 1.82 2.01 1.61 1.44 0.97 1.02 1.08 0.95
Italy 2.21 0.95 1.07 1.23 0.88 0.88 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.59
Latvia 3.34 1.42 1.59 1.77 1.42 1.35 0.93 1.01 1.09 0.93
Lithuania 3.61 1.34 1.50 1.69 1.34 1.58 0.90 0.97 1.06 0.90
Luxembourg 3.12 1.47 1.67 1.96 1.43 1.15 0.86 0.94 1.05 0.85
Netherlands 3.88 1.67 1.84 2.07 1.59 1.72 1.05 1.13 1.22 1.02
Norway 3.82 1.87 2.00 2.18 1.79 1.96 1.24 1.30 1.37 1.20
Poland 3.83 1.20 1.35 1.53 1.20 1.22 0.80 0.87 0.95 0.81
Portugal 3.87 1.68 1.83 2.04 1.57 1.64 1.08 1.14 1.22 1.04
Romania 5.59 1.60 1.77 1.93 1.63 1.59 1.01 1.08 1.14 1.02
Slovak Republic 4.30 1.21 1.39 1.61 1.22 1.50 0.80 0.89 1.00 0.81
Slovenia 3.66 1.20 1.38 1.61 1.14 1.40 0.83 0.92 1.04 0.80
Spain 2.74 1.00 1.10 1.24 0.92 1.15 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.63
Sweden 3.10 1.71 1.85 2.02 1.65 1.63 1.19 1.25 1.33 1.15
Switzerland 3.82 1.57 1.77 2.05 1.51 2.06 1.09 1.19 1.31 1.06
United Kingdom 3.41 1.68 1.85 2.09 1.59 1.63 1.04 1.11 1.20 1.01
Total 27 countries 3.09 1.36 1.51 1.70 1.29 1.30 0.89 0.95 1.03 0.85
Source: own calculations
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123their descendants are going to account for almost one-third of the total labour force
resources in the 27 European countries.
The assumptions of high immigration do not bring a radical change with respect to
population ageing and its effects in comparison to the Base scenario. The ageing
process is going to continue, although its economic consequences will be less intense.
By 2052, the EESR is going to decline on average to 1.70, while the LMSR will reach
1.03. Not surprisingly, this scenario is going to favour countries with relatively large
migration inﬂows. However, fertility and economic activity still play a dominant role.
The highest values of both indicators are reached in Norway and the lowest ones in
Italy (see Table 5), similarly as in the Base scenario.
Fig. 2 Potential Support Ratio in 2002 and 2052—Base scenario.
Source—own calculations
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123In the Low variant, smaller numbers of immigrants in all age groups, especially
the younger ones, inﬂuence the projected labour force resources in the opposite
direction. At the end of the projection period the overall labour force resources in
the 27 countries under study are expected to amount to 184 million people (21% less
than in 2002), that is 47% of the total population. The small net inﬂow of immigrants
is going to negatively inﬂuence the burden of economically inactive persons on the
active population. The average EESR projected for all the countries under study is
going to reach 1.36 in 2052, while the average LMSR will be 0.89. Again, the highest
values of both indicators projected for 2052 are going to be observed in Norway and
Fig. 3 Economic Elderly Support Ratio in 2002 and 2052—Base scenario.
Source—own calculations
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123Denmark, and the lowest ones in Italy and Spain. The country-speciﬁc details are
provided in Table 5.
5.3 The impact of demographic and economic factors on labour force and
activity rates
The post-2002 immigrants and their descendants, who are expected to constitute 20%
of the labour force resources in 2052 in the Base scenario, do not signiﬁcantly mitigate
the effects of the ageing of the labour force. The High and Low projection variants, in
our view reﬂecting the plausible bounds of migration ﬂows to Europe, suggest that
Fig. 4 Labour Market Support Ratio in 2002 and 2052—Base scenario.
Source—own calculations
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123immigration can alleviate, but not offset, the profound effects of population ageing.
The consequences for the European labour markets are twofold: the labour force
decreases and is subject to ageing itself, with increasing shares of older age groups in
the total labour force. The impact of different migration scenarios on the age struc-
tures of the population and the labour force projected for 2052, as well as the
background structures observed in 2002 are presented in Fig. 1 in Sect. 4.1.
Analysing changes in labour force participation, we can distinguish the economic
and demographic effects. The economic effects reﬂect the decision of people in
particular age groups whether to participate in the labour force or not, while the
demographic ones regard the proportions of age groups in the total labour force. In
this study, an increase of all age-speciﬁc activity rates, most notably for the older
groups is assumed. Nonetheless, this is not sufﬁcient to compensate for the ageing of
the population in any scenario considered. Hence, in order to keep the overall
activity rates at a constant level, more radical changes in the economic activity of the
older age groups would be needed.
The declining shares of the labour force in the total population imply a growing
burden of the economically inactive population on the active one. In the Base sce-
nario the burden on the pension system per one active person, indicated by its proxy
variable, the reciprocal of the EESR, is expected to increase 2.4 times within the
next 50 years. In the same period, the per worker overall social security burden (the
reciprocal of the LMSR) is going to increase by 59%. A comparison of the EESR
and the LMSR dynamics indicates that the increase of the social security burden per
one active person is going to stem entirely from the growing number and proportion
of pensioners (65+) in the total population. The burden generated by younger age
groups (15–64) is expected to slightly decline.
The inﬂuence of international migration on these tendencies is again very limited.
WithintheboundssetbytheLowandHighprojectionscenarios,migrationhasaslight
impact on the results (as demonstrated in Table 5), but this effect is not sufﬁcient to
compensate for the scale of changes in any of the projection variants. External net
immigration results in higher EESR and LMSR values in comparison with the ‘zero
migration’simulation,butevenintheHighscenario,withthehighestimmigration,the
EESRandtheLMSRaremuchlowerin2052thanin2002.Thestudysuggeststhathigh
economic activity and, indirectly, high fertility, are more effective and more plausible
in mitigating the economic effects of ageing than high immigration.
5.4 Sensitivity of the results on fertility and labour force participation
assumptions
In addition to the projections presented above, we performed a simple sensitivity
analysis of the impact of fertility assumptions. For each country we assumed three
additional TFR trajectories: the ﬁrst one lower than the one originally projected by
0.25 child per woman throughout the period 2002–2052, the second one higher by
0.25 and the third one higher by 0.50. It has to be noted that these additional
trajectories have been derived in a purely mechanical way and do not relate to any
particular scenarios—there are no underlying stories behind them. Our aim was
simply to specify the plausible lower and upper limits of future fertility changes in
the ﬁrst half of the 21st century. The projected population size and structural indi-
cators obtained under these assumptions (with the remaining projection parameters
as in the Base scenario) are shown in Table 6.
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123The ﬁgures in Table 6, when compared with the ones presented before in
Tables 3 and 5, indicate that fertility changes inﬂuence the overall population size,
but their impact on the structural proxy indicators (the PSR, the EESR and the
LMSR) is rather limited. This is especially visible for the low-fertility countries of
Southern, Central–Eastern and German-speaking Europe. In all 27 countries even
an immediate increase in fertility by 0.50 child per woman, lasting for half a century
ahead, would not offset the effects of ageing within this timeframe. The only
exceptions with respect to the projected LMSR dynamics are Bulgaria and Hungary,
due to the very low initial LMSR values, as well as France, because of the high
fertility continuously assumed throughout the projection horizon. Clearly, the as-
sumed changes in reproductive patterns alone are not sufﬁciently potent to maintain
the support ratios for the coming 50 years.
Another simulation was conducted to verify the impact of labour force partici-
pation on the economic consequences of ageing, measured by the LMSR. We as-
sumed that over the whole period 2002–2052 the age-speciﬁc labour force
participation patterns in each country would stay constant, at the maximum levels
observed in 1985–2002 in all the countries under study. As a result, in a majority of
cases (21 countries), the LMSR would not fall below the values observed in 2002
throughout the projection period. In ﬁve countries such a decline would occur only
in the 2040s (Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic and
Spain). Only in Switzerland, would the LMSR drop below its 2002 value already in
the mid-2020s, due to high initial levels of economic activity. This exercise shows
that an increased labour force participation can offset some labour market side-
effects of population ageing, at least within a couple of decades.
6 Summary and conclusions
This study had two main objectives: to project European populations and labour
force resources for the coming 50 years and to assess the impact of plausible
migration ﬂows on the effects of ageing with respect to the aggregate indicators of
social security and labour market burdens. The latter seems important, as given the
existing zero or negative natural population growth in many European countries,
international migration already now contributes substantially to the vitality of
European populations.
There are a lot of studies, including this one, showing that ageing in Europe and
declining populations in some European countries either are or will become
important, if not overwhelming, phenomena. We agree with Coleman (2004) that
maintaining the population size does not seem to be a valid aim of population policy.
However, Europe is going to face structural changes requiring a modiﬁcation of the
ﬁnancing of social security systems, provision of services and a reshaping of many
aspects of the functioning of the societies. As in many countries the demographic
change results in a declining number of workers and an increasing number of retired,
the pay-as-you-go pension system will soon become impossible to manage.
The comparison of the aggregate indicators for 2002 and 2052 shows that higher
immigration and higher economic activity can slow the negative economic conse-
quences of the ageing process down. It is evident, however, that only a combination
of both, ideally with an increased fertility, can bring the most promising results. With
respect to immigration alone, in order to keep the population structure of Europe
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currently assumed in the High variant of the projection, seen as the high bound of
the possible future immigration size (see also the simulations by the United Nations
2000; Feld 2000; Bijak et al. 2005). The weak sensitivity of the results to fertility
changes indicates that fertility alone is not omnipotent in offsetting the conse-
quences of population ageing either, at least within the timeframe of the coming
50 years.
The projections show that the long-term consequences of demographic change
should be treated by social policy-makers and politicians whose temporal perspec-
tive exceeds the nearest election, with due attention. The changes in social policies
aiming at an increase in fertility, increase in labour force participation and reforms
of pension systems are at the core of the strategies for the adaptation of social and
economic systems to the new demographic patterns. Demographic change cannot be
tackled with marginal or partial reforms. On the contrary, the reforms needed to
compensate the population decline and ageing will be painful, will affect the entire
populations and will reshape the social situation of the next generations.
The results also conﬁrm the diversity of demographic and economic activity
patterns in Europe: policy challenges related to ageing and its labour market con-
sequences are not expected to be very dramatic in Scandinavia, but they are going to
be profound in the South. Especially in countries like Greece, Italy and Spain, a
combination of low fertility and low labour force participation may be very unfa-
vourable in the long run. Out of the menu of basic possible policies aimed at meeting
the challenges posed by ageing (i.e. increased fertility, economic activity and
immigration), the combinations chosen by particular countries should take this
diversity into account, as there is no universal solution. For example, Southern
European countries should primarily focus on increasing fertility and economic
activity, Central Europe on fertility, economic activity and, to some extent, immi-
gration, while for the German-speaking countries fertility comes in the ﬁrst place.
Although the determination of the optimal combinations of policies for particular
countries remains beyond the scope of the current study, it would deﬁnitely be worth
addressing in separate research. Nevertheless, such analysis should take additional
constraining factors into account, especially with respect to migration. For example,
the actual demand for foreign labour, as well as sensitive social and political issues
should be considered (Coleman 2004).
As it has been noted by LaLonde and Topel (2003), most of the existing empirical
research on the effects of international population ﬂows on the labour markets
primarily concerns Australia, Canada and the United States. Therefore, although the
ﬁndings of the current analysis are in general not very novel, we made an attempt to
partially ﬁll the mentioned gap and to perform an analysis of interrelations between
migration and labour force for a diversity of European countries. In this way, we
wanted to contribute to the debate about population ageing and the possible
demographic policy options from an European perspective. Regardless of our con-
tribution, much more empirical research on this and related topics is still necessary
in Europe in order to address one of the key policy challenges of the 21st century.
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